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WATER MARKETING AND THE LAW
Mark Squillace, University of Wyoming College of Law
Natural Resoruces Law Center, Univ. of Colorado School of Law

Eleventh Annual Summer Program, June 6-8, 1990
I. Background.
A fundamental premise of this presentation is that
water marketing can lead to more efficient use of water
resources while at the same time protecting the public
interest, which I define to encompass environmental
values. See e.g., B. Saliba & D. Bush, Water Markets in
Theory and Practice, (Westview Press, 1987). But there
are significant legal impediments to transfers in many
jurisdictions that inhibit transfers and increase
transaction costs. I will explore some of these
impediments focusing principally on the six states
1Th
involved the water transfer study funded by the U.S.
Geological Survey.
A. The prospects for water marketing are good. While
the demand for water has increased over time, the
prospects for development of new surface and ground
water resources is limited. With respect to surface
water, most of the best available dam sites have
either been used or declared unavailable for use.
Further, environmental values have resulted in far
greater scrutiny and higher costs for new surface
water development projects. Groundwater holds
additional promise in some areas. But many states

currently allow groundwater mining, and as aquifers
become depleted or contaminated, these groundwater
users can be expected to bring added pressure to other
available supplies. Although not a panacea, water
marketing may be able to relieve some of the pressure
for additional water resources.
B. Where will the water come from? The charts below
indicate the percentage of water in the six study
states that are used by various enterprises. As Table
1 illustrates, agricultural uses dominate other uses
in all of the study states. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, agriculture plays a relatively minor role in
the economic picture for these same states as
indicated in Table 2. Thus, the agriculture community
will necessarily play a key role in determining
whether water transfers to other uses occur.
Importantly, and as described in greater detail below,
such transfers do not necessarily translate into a
reduction in the agricultural sector of the economy.
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Table 1.
ESTIMATED CONSUMPTIVE FRESHWATER USE BY STATE, 19135
(in millions of gallons per day)
Irrigation

Domestic

Other

Total

Arizona

3170 (85.4%)

275 (7.4%)

268.8 (7.2%)

3711.8

California

19300 (91.3%)

879(4.1%)

993

(4.6%)

21172

Colorado

4570(94.2%)

145(3%)

138

(2.8%)

4853

New Mexico

1270(83%)

106(6.9%)

154.1 (10.1%)

1530.1

Utah

1940(86.1%)

119(5.3%)

193.5 (8.6%)

2252.5

Wyoming

2560 (95.8%)

30 (1.1%)

83.4 (3.1%)

2673.4

Totals

32810

1554

1828.8

38-101

4%

5%

100%

Approx. percentage91%
of all uses

Source: Adapted from Estimated Use of Water In the United States In 1985 (U S. Geological Survey Circular 1084)
(1987) at Tables 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14.

Table 2.
GROSS STATE PRODUCT (1988)

(in millions of dollars)

Total

Farms, Forestry,
Fisheries Ag Services

Arizona

53,253

1,122(2.1%)

California

533,816

11,282(2.2%)

Colorado

59,177

1,517 (2.6%)

New Mexico

23,603

613 (2.2%)

Utah

24,008

403 (1.7%)

Wyoming

11,673

219(1.9%)

Adapted from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1989, Table No. 698.

II. Legal Impediments to Transfers. The common law
rule regarding transfer of water rights in prior
appropriation states is the "no injury" rule. Under this
rule, transfers are permitted so long as they can be
completed without causing injury to any persons lawfully
3

using water at the time of the transfer. On its face,
the "no injury" rule suggests a rather simple test for
determining whether to authorize a transfer. But
transfer decisions can become complex due, in part, to
the very nature of water rights, but due also to nuances
in individual state laws. For example, many water rights
afford the owner the right to divert water from a stream
at a certain rate, usually expressed in cubic feet per
second (CFS). Where the owner of that right diverts such
water seasonally, rather than year round, as with many
agricultural rights, defining the water right available
for transfer may become a complex (and controversial)
task. Furthermore, even where rights can be accurately
quantified, predicting the affect of a transfer on other
users can be difficult and expensive.

Conflicting

forecasts are not uncommon.
Although individual states regulate transfers in
different ways, the differences among state laws which
affect water transfers do not always relate to the
provisions for transfers themselves, but often to other
aspects of a state's water laws. A state which offers
a useful illustration of this phenomenon is Arizona. The
fundamental precept of western water law is that prior
appropriators of water for beneficial use have preference
over other users. Some western states, including
Arizona, however, apply different rules to non-tributary
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groundwater.

In Arizona, groundwater rights have

historically been tied to surface ownership. Prior
appropriation for a beneficial use is not required.
Instead a landowner has a right to appropriate all of
the water that can be out to a reasonable and beneficial
use. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-453(1). Although
changes in the State's groundwater laws in 1980
established restrictive rules for areas where significant
groundwater mining was taking place (ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-401 to 651), aquifers outside these areas
remained largely unaffected. This fact has led to the
speculative acquisition of groundwater rights. Several
large companies and municipal governments have purchased
large tracts of land in southern Arizona -- water farms - either to secure future groundwater supplies for their
residents or in hopes of selling water rights at a great
profit. The opportunities to purchase water farms
appears to have hampered the market for water rights and
thus resulted in minimal transfer activity.
The State of Wyoming offers a contrasting problem.
Unlike Arizona, Wyoming adheres to a prior appropriation
scheme for allocating both surface and groundwater
rights. But from the time Elwood Mead served as
Wyoming's first state engineer, Wyoming has approached
transfers reluctantly.

In 1909, the state adopted

legislation expressly prohibiting any change in use or

place of use of a water right without loss of priority.
WYO. STAT. § 41-3-101. Although this provision has never
been repealed, the legislature has, over time, carved out
exceptions • to the law, and in 1973 Wyoming finally
adopted legislation expressly authorizing transfers under
certain specified conditions.

But significant

impediments to transfers remain. In addition to the
traditional "no injury" rule, a transferee in Wyoming may
not increase the rate of diversion of the water, nor
decrease the return flows, nor increase the historical
levels of beneficial consumptive use. Furthermore, the
law gives the Board of Control discretion to deny
transfers upon consideration of economic losses to
communities that will lose the water right, the extent
to which that loss will be offset by the new use, and
whether other sources of water are available. WYO. STAT.
§ 41-3-104.
Ironically, even where a state actively promotes
transfers, transfer activity may be limited. Since the
early 19805, California has had what are among the most
progressive water transfer laws in the country. See
e.g., CAL. WATER 'CODE ,§ 109. These laws actively
encourage water transfers. In particular, California law
actively promotes the transfer of surplus water, that is
water rights that exceed the real needs of the
transferor, and conserved water, water that is saved by
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making a water diversion or use system more efficient.
Gray, California Water Transfers Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev.
745, 771 (1989). Yet few transfers have occurred, other
than temporary annual transfers among users within large
irrigations districts. The reason for this limited
market activity is uncertain but appears in part related
to fact that so much of the water in California is tied
in with large water projects. Although California law
expressly authorizes local or regional water agencies to
transfer water rights (CAL. WATER CODE, § 381-382),
resistance to transfers among the agencies water users
may impose political limitations on such transfers.
Federal involvement in certain water projects may further
hamper the marketability of water in California. It is
probably too early to assess the impact of the California
legislation on California water markets, but the state's
efforts have yet to bear significant fruit.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Reallocation of

water supplies through the transfer mechanism holds much
promise for more effective use of limited water
resources. But the water laws in some states continue
to hamper beneficial water transfers and, accordingly,
these laws should be changed. Set forth below are
recommendations for improving state water transfer laws.
Some states have already moved in the direction of many
of these recommendations.

A. Allow the transfer of conserved or salvaged cater.
With a few notable exceptions, including Oregon and
California, states have resisted efforts to allow
users to transfer salvaged water, i.e., water that is
saved through increased efficiency, either by selling
the water to another user or using the water on new
lands. These prohibitions generally apply even where
no one will be injured by such action. Thus, for
example, if you save water by lining your ditches,
cutting down vegetation along your ditches or
installing an efficient sprinkler system, you are
prohibited in many states from transferring the water
saved. As a result, farmers with early priority dates
who are using inefficient irrigation methods have
little incentive to become more efficient.
B. Establish a presumption in favor of transfers.
California, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah actively
encourage transfers by establishing a presumption in
favor of the transfer. Thus, after an applicant has
made a prima facie case that no injury will occur, the
ultimate burden falls on the protestant to show that
the applicant is wrong and injury will occur. A
legitimate concern about this proposal is that it
places a substantial burden on person not involved in
the transfer to discover and protest their potential
injury. This concern can be addressed, however, by
8

allowing downstream users to invoke a trial transfer
provision as described below.
C. Encourage trial transfers. One of the most
significant problems with transfers concerns the
difficulty in predicting the actual impact of a
transfer on the hydrology of an area generally, and on
other users in particular. As a result, states like
Wyoming take a very conservative approach toward
transfers as a means for protecting existing water
users. Such an approach is unnecessary if the
transfer decision can be reopened for appropriate
adjustments based on actual stream conditions. This
practice has been used with considerable success in
Colorado and to a more limited extent in California.
D. Return to the "no injury" rule. None of the study
states restricts transfers to the extent that Wyoming
does, but many states refuse to transfer water beyond
the historic consumptive use. A historic consumptive
use determination may be useful, as an evidentiary
matter to help the fact-finder in deciding whether
injury to other appropriators will occur. This is
because injury is unlikely if total consumption will
not increase. But injury may be avoided in some cases
even where the consumption increases. States should
avoid concerning themselves with the private benefits
that may result from transfers so long as such

transfers provide incentives to increase the efficient
use of water resources.
E. Include the public interest within the scope of
injury considered in transfer applications. While
most of the suggestions made here encourage transfers,
they should not be approved without fair consideration
of the public interest values at stake. Thus, if a
transfer would not injure other appropriators but
would cause unacceptable damage to fish or wildlife
resources, states should deny such transfers. To help
alleviate uncertainty that public interest
considerations might -bring, state agencies should
define the phrase "public interest" through rulemaking
or other public proceedings.
F. Define the phrase "public interest". The phrase
"public interest" should be defined to ensure
protection of the stream environment and other values.
Further, if the definition is not set out in a
statute, as for example in Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §
46.15.080(b)), the relevant agency should engage in
rulemaking proceedings to define the term. This will
allow for a full opportunity for consideration and
evaluation of public comments.
G. Encourage innovative reallocation schemes. In
order to maximize use of existing water resources
states should encourage innovative reallocation
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schemes. For example, a state might establish a water
bank to encourage more efficient use of water. Water
saved as a result of adopting modern irrigation
practices could be banked without risk of loss through
abandonment. States might also encourage cities and
others who need a secure supply of water, even during
dry years, to purchase "dry land options" from
agricultural users. In normal years, the option would
not be exercised since the user would have sufficient
supplies from existing sources. In dry years, the
city could exercise its option by making an additional
payment to the farmer who sold the option. The land
that was normally farmed would thus be retired only
during the drought years.

Water marketing holds much promise for the West
because of its potential for making water usage more
efficient. Although some states have made great strides
in promoting water transfers much can be done to further
encourage water marketing opportunities, while at the
same time protecting the public interest.
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